It's not yours to promise…

When someone is promised something, it suggests a special favor. This idea often comes up in discussions about “Kurdistan.” The word promise sets up a relationship between the person making the promise and the one receiving it. In that relationship, the person who promises is seen as having the power to give, withhold, or fulfill what is promised. This is why I find the language problematic when it is used to talk about Kurdish self-determination.

What exactly was promised to whom? And, more importantly, who had the authority to make such a promise?

The Treaty of Sèvres was not created by Kurds as an act of sovereignty. Instead, it was forced on the Ottoman Empire by the Allied powers after their victory. The idea of Kurdish autonomy or independence came from European diplomacy, not from any natural right of European states over Kurdish lands. This matters because saying “Europe promised Kurdistan to the Kurds” puts Europe in the role of giver and the Kurds as receivers. It changes the issue from one of political existence and self-determination to one of European generosity.

I am not saying that Sèvres does not matter. In fact, it is important because it shows that Kurdish political autonomy became part of international diplomacy. But we do not have to use the language of kindness or generosity when we talk about this historical fact. There is also some irony in the conditions set for Kurdish autonomy. Kurds had to prove they could and wanted to govern themselves, but the final decision was left to the same international powers that had shaped the region’s borders. So, self-determination was only possible if those in power agreed the Kurds were ready for it.

This raises a question that extends beyond the Kurdish case. Can a people be said to have been “given” the right to determine themselves? 

If the answer is yes, then self-determination becomes something another power can give or take away. That is very different from the idea of self-determination itself. Talking about rights means something belongs to a people, but talking about promises means it belongs to the one making the promise. This is why I pause when I hear people say, “the Kurds should have had their own country because they were promised one.” While there may be some truth to this, the way it is said is misleading. Kurds did not gain the right to self-determination just because European powers talked about a Kurdish state. Instead, that discussion was only one part of a much longer struggle over who had the power to decide the region’s future. There is another problem with seeing Sèvres as just a promise. The treaty was never put into practice as the region’s political settlement. Turkish nationalists rejected it, and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 replaced it. So, whatever hopes Sèvres created, it cannot simply be seen as a contract that Europe made with the Kurds and then failed to honor. The history is more complex. Great powers had different interests, Ottoman lands were being reorganized, Turkish nationalism was growing, and Kurdish political groups were not always united around one goal.

But these complications do not make the idea of a “promise” any more convincing. Instead, they make it even more important to ask why we remember the promise as if it was Europe’s to keep. Perhaps the more accurate question is not “Why did Europe break its promise to the Kurds?” but “Why was the political future of the Kurds placed in the hands of powers that could promise it in the first place?” 

This difference matters to me because it feels wrong to see Kurdish history only through what European states did. It takes away Kurdish political agency. Kurds become people waiting to receive something, instead of people who made demands, organized movements, resisted, negotiated, and debated among themselves about their future. This does not mean we should ignore what Europe did. Colonialism and European decisions had huge effects on the borders and institutions of today’s Middle East. It also does not mean that Kurdish suffering and hopes can be separated from those decisions. My point is more specific: being responsible is not the same as owning, and being involved in history is not the same as having the right to promise someone a homeland.

Maybe instead of saying “the Kurds were promised a country,” we should use a more accurate, if less comfortable, phrase: European powers discussed and briefly included the idea of Kurdish political autonomy in a settlement they were creating. That might seem like a small difference in wording, but I do not think it is. Words like “promise,” “give,” “grant,” and even “allow” all suggest certain ideas about power. When these words are used again and again to talk about Kurdish political hopes, they can reinforce the same power imbalance that people are trying to challenge. A European might truly support Kurdish independence, but still speak as if Europe has the right to give Kurdistan back.

But it was never Europe's to promise.

And maybe that is the bigger question to consider: not whether Europe failed to give the Kurds what it promised, but why we still talk as if Europe ever had the right to decide what belonged to the Kurds in the first place.

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